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This thesis investigates the competition between transshipment container ports. The main 
purpose of this thesis is to develop the model that can capture the trends in transshipment 
container port competition and behaviours of key players, ports and shipping lines, in their 
decision making. 
Studying industrial events and relevant literatures led us to choose the key factors 
that play an important role in port competition problem. The key determinants such as port 
capacity, price, congestion and transshipment level are taken into account model 
development. Subsequently, multiple functions are created to examine the interdependency 
among shipping lines when determining port demand. 
With a linear transshipment container demand, it is able to achieve analytical 
properties through a two-stage game approach. Considering a nonlinear transshipment 
container demand in the model, it results in Multiple Nash equilibria in shipping lines’ port 
call decision. Asymmetric shipping lines are also studied in the model for investigating their 
demand driving forces.  
Overall, this thesis addresses the characteristics of transshipment container 
demand and shipping lines’ port call decision towards transshipment benefit and congestion-
associated effect. Most of all, this thesis can help advance the analysis on ports’ 
transshipment capabilities and enable the ports to uncover and balance its demand and 
capacity levels so as to strategize for the long term. It can also provide better visibility on the 
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Container transshipment market, as shown in Figure 1.1, has been expanding 
significantly during last two decades. Growth in demand for transshipment containers 
has been led by several changes in container shipping market. These changes, as an 
attempt to be a price competitive and improve services, aim towards cost savings 
through the emergence of the global and total logistics.  
 
Figure 1.1 World container port traffic 1990-20111 
                                                            






Figure 1.2 Trends and challenges in container shipping market2 
In particular, shipping lines, the key player in container transport market, develop the 
larger form of strategic arrangements such as alliances. Globalization of shipping lines 
gave a strong market power to shipping alliances as international shipping lines have 
more choices in calling at ports. As a result, alliances and other cooperative 
arrangements have power to control significant cargo flows on the major global trade 
routes. With much appreciation of advanced technology and importance of economies 
of scale in ship size, currently 8,000-10,000 TEU ships dominated major Asian trade 
routes. Since 2002, ships above 6,000 TEU have come into operation on Asian routes 
and some of the shipping lines have been deploying even larger ships (16,000 TEU is 
the largest ship size by 2012). The implication of increase in ship size has been given 
great attention to the hub and spoke system, where the biggest ships will call at only a 
limited number of efficient ports on the main trade routes, with other ports being 
connected by extended feeder networks. As illustrated in Figure 1.2, the strategic 
alliances of global shipping lines and ever growing ship size, together with hub and 
                                                            






spoke system resulted in expansion of transhipment market. Major container ports are 
competing to be a regional hub to capture this significant amount of container demand. 
The competition status of transshipment hub ports especially in Asia region, where the 
dominant ports are located in, is getting intense. Moreover, current dominant 
transshipment hub ports are being challenged by the emergence of other fast-
developing ports that are located within proximity of the region.  
1.2 Motivation 
In 2000, Maersk Sealand relocated its major transshipment operations from the Port of 
Singapore (PSA) to the Port of Tanjung Pelepas (PTP) in Malaysia. The impact of this 
relocation on the regional transshipment market structure was significant. Maersk 
Sealand was then the largest shipping operator in Singapore. Its shift to PTP resulted 
in a decline of approximately 11% in PSA’s overall business. In 2001, PSA’s total 
container throughput fell from 17.09 million TEUs to 15.52 million TEUs (Tongzon 
2006), marking a year-on-year drop of 8.9 %. In the same period, PTP’s container 
throughput had increased nearly 5 folds, from 0.42 million to 2.05 million TEUs.3The 
shipping industry in Singapore and the region grew concerned about Maersk Sealand’s 
relocation and the potential ripple effect on other shipping lines’ decisions and related 
business activities (Allison 2000; Kleywegt et al. 2002). As shipping lines form 
strategic alliances to achieve economies of scale, the interdependency among alliance 
members and small- and medium-size shipping lines heightens. Consequently, Maersk 
Sealand’s decision on changing its transshipment port-of-call could well induce 
similar decisions among affiliating carriers. In 2002, Evergreen and its subsidiary 
Uniglory also shifted most of their container operations, amounting to 1-1.2 million 
                                                            
3 The container throughput data is taken from the official website of Port of Tanjung Pelepas, 





TEUs of annual throughput, from PSA to PTP. Since then, other shipping lines have 
also started to provide direct services to PTP. APL, for example, had chosen PTP for 
its West Asia Express service between Asia and the Middle East (Kleywegt et al. 
2002).   
In the case of competition between PTP and PSA, the acquisition of 
transshipment cargo is critical. Both ports are subjected to stringent growth limitations 
as gateway ports but possess excellent locations along the Strait of Malacca. 
Transshipment presents a good opportunity for these ports to expand beyond the 
demands of their respective catchment economies and more importantly, tap into the 
international cargo flows to enjoy superior profits. Beyond the potential spike in the 
number of cargo handling jobs and value-added activities, a transshipment port would 
also gain access to profitable feeder line networks which serve to transport containers 
to/from tributary ports4. These networks give transshipment ports good connectivity, 
which in turn strengthens itself through the ripple effect. As the importance of 
achieving dominance in the market becomes apparent, it is foreseeable for regional 
ports to compete for transshipment container traffic. 
There are many possible attributions to the above mentioned relocations 
(mainly from the cost and operational perspectives), of which port pricing emerges as 
one of the probable causes. As global customers exert increasing pressure on shipping 
lines to lower their prices, the competition to reduce costs among shipping lines 
inevitably intensifies. Shipping lines are forced to explore options which give the most 
cost-saving. With these drivers in mind, the attractiveness of PTP’s port price, which 
was some 30% lower than that of PSA’s at that time, becomes apparent. In fact, 
                                                            
4 The feeder line networks between transshipment port and tributary port have been mentioned in the 





Evergreen had estimated that their shift to PTP would save them between US$ 5.7 
million and US$ 30 million per annum (Kleywegt et al. 2002).  
A similar event took place in February 2006 between two major 
transshipment ports in South Korea, Busan and Gwangyang port. Maersk, after 
merging with P&O Nedlloyd, relocated 50-60% of P&O’s transshipment operation 
that was originally handled in Busan port, to Gwangyang port. As a result, Busan port, 
after 6-month later, lost about 250,000 TEU from its transshipment business with P&O 
Nedlloyd. Two major reasons behind this event were found, i.e., port charge and 
congestion. The port charge in Busan port at that time was almost double compared to 
Gwangyang port’s charge. Moreover, Gwangyang port provided a dedicated berth, 
thus there is no congestion issue to shipping line, while Busan port had high 
congestion problems due to its general usage of the berth.5 
Considering the abovementioned industrial events, this thesis attempts to 
study a regional hub port competition for transshipment containers with respect to port 
price and congestion associated issues.   
1.3 Objective 
This study tries to understand the complexity of the situation in port competition, 
especially for competition over the transshipment cargos. Author believes that to 
understand the real world problems, the modeling a simple, yet representative version 
of the real situation must take precedence, so as to appreciate the broad characteristics. 
Therefore, this study seeks to simplify the underlying complexities in exchange for a 
more mathematical approach to the port competition problem. In particular, this thesis 
                                                            





aims to provide the managerial insight to explain the trend and behaviour of ports and 
shipping lines in transshipment container market. This thesis is a fundamental study to 
develop a model that provides insights on basic market behaviors with potential 
possibility to extend the model uncovering real situation of port competition problem 
in the future. 
1.4 Overview 
The remaining parts of this thesis are organized as follows:  
 In Chapter 2, studies relevant to port competition are reviewed. The key factors 
considered in this study are found in port selection literatures, where it supports 
our choice of critical determinants. Port competition studies that adopted an 
empirical method and game theory suggest a way to approach the port 
competition problem for this study. 
 In Chapter 3, the base model for analysing transshipment port competition is 
developed with a linear transshipment container demand function. It presents 
the findings obtained from both analytical works and numerical experiments.  
 In Chapter 4, our base model is advanced to a nonlinear transshipment 
container demand. In this case, Multiple Nash equilibria occur in shipping lines’ 
port call decision. The intensive numerical analyses are conducted in order to 
explore the combined effect among key factors.    
 In Chapter 5, some pricing strategies are proposed to study the preferences of 
asymmetric shipping lines. It is also investigated a demand driving force in 





Finally, Chapter 6 discusses about limitations and contributions of this thesis, and 















Chapter 2 Literature Review 
Literature Review 
 
2.1 Port Selection 
Port selection6 studies usually aim to find the key factors that affect the port users’ 
decision for selecting a port. In other words, it approaches port competition problem 
from the port users’ perspective. There is an issue on decision maker for selecting a 
port; shippers (Slack 1985; Bird and Bland 1988; Murphy and Daley 1994; Tongzon 
2002; Nir et al. 2003; Tiwary et al. 2004) or shipping lines7. Although Slack (1985) 
conducted his study from the shipper’s perspective, he mentioned in his analysis of 
survey results that shipping lines are the key actors in the port selection process. Also, 
D’Este et al.(1992a,1992b) suggested that as shipping lines increased their scale of 
operations and shippers began soliciting prices for door-to-door service rather than 
individual segments, the port selection shifted from the shipper to the shipping lines. 
Tongzon and Sawant (2007) have stated that globalization, mergers and acquisitions 
among shipping lines enable to form the greater volumes that are controlled by a 
single line or alliance. This implies that the capacity of shipping line to seriously affect 
the business of a port is much greater than it has been in the past. This warrants a need 
for the port operators to understand the underlying factors of port competitiveness 
from the shipping lines’ perspective. Therefore, more recent studies approach port 
                                                            
6 “Port choice” is often used as similar term. 





selection problem from the shipping lines’ perspective (D’Este et al., 1992a; 1992b; 
Tongzon and Sawant 2007; Chang et al. 2008). Based on this perspective, this thesis 
considers shipping lines as main port users.  
Figure 2.1 summarizes the port selection criteria found in the existing port 
selection literatures. In particular, with increasing importance of the port function as a 
transshipment facility, recent port selection studies have paid attention to 
transshipment port selection problem. Lirn et al.(2003; 2004) found in their studies 
that the transshipment port selection problem is depending mainly on port 
competitiveness and efficiency, as represented by the cost and the container loading 
and discharging rates, respectively. Similarly, Chou (2007) suggested port manager 
that if they want to become a transshipment hub port, it will be the most efficient way 
to attract ocean carriers by increasing the volume of import/export/transshipment 
containers and decreasing port charge. Chang et al.(2008) considered port selection 
problem from the trunk liners’ and feeder service providers’ perspective. Authors 
concluded that local cargo volume, terminal handling charge, berth availability, port 
location, transshipment volume and feeder network are the most important factors.  
 





Our consideration of key factors in transshipment port competition problem, i.e. port 
price, port capacity, transshipment level and congestion cost, seems valid as these 
factors have been consistently selected in the existing literatures. Therefore, we will 
take into account these factors to our model development. 
2.2 Port Competition 
The methodologies adopted in port competition studies are summarized mainly into 
the categories of empirical research and game theory.  
2.2.1 Empirical Research 
Existing empirical researches have used various models to analyse actual data to draw 
the insights of competition between or among ports. Chou et al.(2003) used SWOT 
analysis to analyze the competitiveness of major container ports in Asia eastern region, 
where the major ports are including Hong Kong, Singapore, Busan, Kaohsiung and 
Shanghai. Yang and Yang (2005) attempted to develop an index system to evaluate 
container port competition ability. For this, authors combined the empirical survey 
method and AHP(analytical hierarchy process), and optimal path-searching algorithm. 
An AHP analysis has been used by Yuen et al.(2012) to study port competitiveness. 
Authors approached the problem from the users’ perspective and studied the major 
container ports in China and neighboring countries. Adopting the branch of regression, 
Veldman and Bückmann(2003) used a logit model for routing options and derived the 
demand function to be used for port traffic forecasting and for the economic and 
financial evaluation of container port project. The authors calibrated logit models in 
the framework of the evaluation of the Massvlakte-2 container port expansion project 





model(VECM) with structural identification to capture the trade-interdependency and 
oligopolistic relationship in the East and Southeast Asian market for container 
handling services. Similarly, Yap and Lam(2006) employed unit root test, 
cointegration test and error correction model to analyze given ports data.  
In general, port competition studies approached by empirical method can 
build theories and generate the hindsight wisdom as it is based on real data. However, 
it is found that the results drawn from particular data may be limited to specific cases, 
thus the method is more restrictive in usage.   
2.2.2 Game Theory 
Zan (1999) was one of the earliest authors who had attempted to use the game theory 
to investigate the behaviour of port users (carriers and shippers) in transshipment port 
management policy. He used a bi-level Stackelberg game to capture the flow of 
foreign trade containers. Lam and Yap (2006) approached regional port competition 
problem with Cournot simultaneous quantity setting model. Their model is used to 
derive the overall costs of using the terminal, and applied to competition between 
container terminal operators in Singapore, Port Klang and Tanjung Pelepas. Anderson 
et al.(2008) developed a game-theoretic best response frame work for understanding 
how competitor ports will respond to development at a focus port, and whether the 
focus port will be able to capture or defend market share by building additional 
capacity and applied their model to investment and competition currently occurring 
between the ports of Busan and Shanghai. Saeed and Larsen (2010) studied intra-port 
competition and examined the possible combinations of coalitions among container 
terminals. The two-stage game has been employed to analyse possible coalitions: in 





individually or to join a coalition; and in the second stage, the resulting coalition plays 
a non-cooperative game against non-members. De Borger et al. (2008) used a two-
stage game to analyse the interaction between the pricing behaviour of competing 
ports and the optimal investment policies in the ports and hinterland capacity. Similar 
form of analysis has been used in recent port competition problem that is further 
investigated as part of rivalry between two alternative intermodal transportation chains; 
hence, recent studies have taken into account hinterland access and road congestion in 
order to observe their impact on ports and port competition (Zhang, 2008; Yuen et al., 
2008; Wan et al., 2012; Wan and Zhang, 2013). As noticed, it is only recently that 
scholars and industry start to pay attention to applying game theory to competition 
problem in maritime industry; hence, relatively not many studies have tackled the port 
competition problem by game theory approaches, especially for transshipment port 
competition. 
Game theory provides a framework for analysing any competitive situation 
game. We can identify the market players, their possible actions and reactions to the 
actions of rivals, and the payoffs or rewards implicit in the game. Game theory models 
reduce the world in which businesses operate from a highly complex one to one that is 
simpler, while retaining some original important characteristics. By capturing and 
clarifying the most significant aspects of competition and interdependence, game 
theory models make it possible to extract a complex competitive situation into its key 
components so as to analyse the complex dynamics between players. The main 
assumption behind the game theory is that the players in a game are behaving 
rationally, hence choosing their actions optimally; that is, players are choosing their 
actions in the aim of maximising their payoff and that the other players are doing 





business strategies when confronted with a complex strategic situation. Moreover, the 
concept of Nash equilibrium solution in game theory gives a strategy profile in the 
competition. As we intend to approach port competition problem from the 
optimization perspective, it would be pertinent to applying game theory to the ports 
and shipping lines within the port competition arena.  
2.3 Game Theory in Aviation Industry 
As defined by De Borger and Van Dender (2006), congestible facilities are facilities 
which are prone to congestion when the volume of simultaneous users increases amid 
constant capacity. Examples of such facilities include seaports, airports, Internet 
access providers and roads. Studies dealt with congestible facilities often choose a 
game theory as their research methodology. For instance, Baake and Mitusch (2007) 
analysed competition between two network providers. Authors analysed Bertrand 
competition and Cournot competition in order to compare the equilibrium solution for 
the competitive price and capacity expansion.  
In the context of airports competition, a game theory has been intensively 
used in this industry. In particular, Basso and Zhang (2007) developed a model for 
congestible facility rivalry in vertical structures which explains the relationship among 
the congestible facility and its intermediate user (airline) and final users (passengers). 
Zhang and Zhang (2006) studied about airport capacity and congestion when carriers 
have market power. Their study investigated the impact of carriers’ self-internalized 
congestion on the airport. Similar to Basso and Zhang (2007), the model of airline and 
airport behaviour is based on the two stage game, where in the first stage, the airport 
decides on the airport charge and capacity, whereas in the second stage, each carrier 





that the market structure of aviation industry seems largely similar to the structure of 
maritime industry. Furthermore, not only the competition problem but also market 
issues such as privatization (Zhang and Zhang 2003), strategic alliances (Zhang and 
Zhang 2006) and carriers’ market power are important issues in maritime industry as 
well. Since the aviation industry has been successfully applied game theory to 
analysing market structure and addressing management issue, it seems to stand 













Chapter 3 Base Model Development 
Base Model Development 
 
3.1 Overview 
The main purpose of this chapter is to develop a base model for transshipment port 
competition and deliver the theoretical properties to explain the trends and behaviours 
of the shipping lines and ports. In particular, it is introduced a LTCD function, a 
quadratic congestion delay cost function and profit functions for both shipping lines 
and ports. Based on the model, analytical works are obtained and the findings are 
demonstrated by numerical experiments. This chapter has been published in the 
flagship journal of international shipping and port research, Maritime Policy & 
Management.8  
This chapter is organized as follows: Section 3.2 shows our model 
formulation with a LTCD function. We then, in the section 3.3, proceed to apply the 
non-cooperative two-stage game to our problem. In section 3.4, the port collusion 
model and social optimum model which may reflect the current business models of 
shipping lines are briefly analysed. Results from our numerical simulations are then 
shown in section 3.5 to further explain the findings. Some of special cases, enabling to 
                                                            
8Min Ju Bae, Ek Peng Chew, Loo Hay Lee and Anming Zhang. 2013. “Container transshipment and 





show analytical derivatives for port pricing stage, are presented in section 3.6, and 
finally section 3.7 concludes this chapter. 
3.2 The Model 
Consider two container transshipment ports, r =1, 2, which provide homogenous 
container handling services to their customers within a stipulated period of time. The 
customers are identical shipping lines, i =1,…, N. The market structure and key 
variables are shown in Figure 3.1 for better understanding.  
 
Figure 3.1 Market structure and key variables 
Our LTCD function given in (3.1) denotes total number of containers which shipping 
line i loads and unloads at port r.  
ir r rF f g Q       for  1, 2r                                                                             (3.1) 
where f represents the loaded and unloaded gateway container demand, rg is a 









Q q where 0 1irq  and 
1   for  is irq q r s   . It has to be noted that irq  is the decision variable which 
indicates a fraction of transshipment port calls that shipping line i makes at port r. Fir 
is made up of two components: the gateway container and the transshipment container. 
Since this study focuses on transshipment container demand, we assume that the 
gateway container demand f is constant. This assumption helps simplify analytical 
work. On the other hand, at a conceptual level, gr can be used to represent a port’s 
“connectivity,” which can be defined as the port’s network connection to other 
transport modes that extend to other destinations (e.g., feeder services, hinterland 
connection, etc.). In logistics, a transshipment port is akin to a transit facility. As such, 
shipping lines which adopt the hub-and-spoke transportation system are likely to 
prefer a transshipment port that has an extensive and strong network connection.  
Meanwhile, it has to be noted that our LTCD function generates an equal 
amount of transshipment volume for all shipping lines calling at same port, regardless 
of the number of port calls that each shipping line has made. For our transshipment 
focus, it is assumed that the transshipment container demand depends only on ports’ 
handling capability and aggregate contribution of shipping lines’ port calls in the 
stipulated period of time. From the container handling demand function (3.1), each 
port’s demand function (3.2) can be derived: 
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where  2 2 1 11 1 1N Ni ii iQ q q N Q       . And then, we can derive the following 
properties by differentiating (3.2) with respect to 1iq : 
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Properties (3.3) illustrate that an increase in the expected number of port calls made at 
port 1 would lead to a decrease in the expected number of port calls made at port 2. 
This result is expected since we assume 2 11i iq q  . Furthermore, the magnitude of 
changes in the expected number of port calls depends on each port’s transshipment 
level rg . We now consider the congestion delay cost function rD  as shown in (3.4), 
where this function possesses a quadratic form. Since this study only considers port 
capacity and port demand as a measurement of port congestion, this quadratic 
congestion function simply and efficiently captures the trend of congestion at port. We 
further assume that / 1r rF K  , with rK being 85% utilization of port r’s maximum 
capacity maxrK .    
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                                                                        (3.4)                        
where ra  is a positive parameter and
max0.85 r rK K .  Thus, the congestion delay cost 
function rD  is increasing with the number of port calls made to port r while 
decreasing with port’s capacity rK .
 The following properties are derived: 
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Property (3.5) depicts that the congestion externality is convex in the port’s demand. It 
is also intuitive that the congestion externality would decrease with port handling 
capacity as shown in (3.6). The delay cost parameter ra  is further assumed to be the 






3.3 A Non-Cooperative Two-stage Game 
We now study a non-cooperative two-stage game with duopolistic transshipment ports 
and a continuum of identical shipping lines. We first develop the profit functions for 
shipping lines and ports. Shipping lines’ profit function and constraints are given by: 
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where ip  is shipping line’s container price, ic  is unit operating cost and r is port 
price. Among shipping lines, both pricing and cost incurrence are assumed to be 
identical, hence denoting them with p and c  respectively. In the shipping line’s profit 
function, the congestion delay cost function rD  is captured as a cost component. This 
is to model the shipping line’s preference for a less congested port, considering that 
port congestion often leads to delays, which in turn translate to additional costs to the 
shipping lines. The first constraint in (3.7) shows that irq  is normalized between 0 and 
1. The second constraint indicates that the shipping line’s total number of port call is 
fixed to 1 so as to facilitate our analysis of shipping lines’ allocation decision in 
response to the ports’ capacities, prices and transshipment levels. The third constraint 
is, as mentioned previously, a capacity constraint. The ports’ objective is also to 
maximize profits. Port’s profit function r is given by  





where rO  is ports’ operation cost per unit, and rm is unit capacity cost. The ports’ 
operation and capacity costs are, for simplicity, assumed to be separable and constant.9  
The unit capacity cost is the additional investment (capital) required to 
increase one unit of capacity. In practice, the unit capacity cost is computed by 
dividing the total development costs of the port by its total design capacity. It can be 
measured on per berth basis (if the berths are largely homogenous) or on a per 
container basis. In this case, we use the latter due to its ease in fitting into our model. 
The cost of capacity is assumed to be a linear function of capacity. The operation cost 
is the direct cost (variable cost) relating to running the port, which we expressed as the 
cost of handling a unit of container. There are many ways to estimate port capacity in 
the real world. One of the most popular methods is to estimate it based on the number 
of berths, as the berth is commonly the bottleneck of the port. The unit capacity cost is 
usually used for the port expansion analysis. There is an intention to expand this study 
to capacity expansion analysis in the future as well as observe the effects of unit 
capacity cost with respect to differing capacity levels. 
Based on these functions, we now specify our two-stage game: in the first 
stage, each port maximizes its profit by choosing its port price, and in the second stage, 
each shipping line makes its port call decision to maximize profit, while observing the 
ports’ capacities, prices and transshipment levels. 
3.3.1 Stage two: Shipping Lines’ Port Call Decision 
To examine the sub-game perfect Nash equilibrium, the game is to be solved using 
backward induction, starting with the second-stage game. Given port capacities, prices, 
                                                            
9 The separable and constant port operation and capacity marginal cost has been assumed in, e.g., Basso 





and transshipment levels, shipping lines simultaneously assign their port calls to both 
ports. We assume Cournot behaviour in shipping lines competition10 leading to the 
following first-order conditions:  
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(3.9) 
The assumption of symmetry among the shipping lines’ price ip p  and cost ic c  
for all i , and partial derivatives from (3.3) imply that the best response function of 
shipping line i  is identical for all i , i.e. ...ir Nrq q  . Applying our earlier analysis on 
the shipping lines’ profit function, we obtain: 
Lemma 1 . Shipping line i’s profit i  is concave in 1iq . 
Proof. See Appendix A. 
Lemma 1 shows that i  has a maximum in 1iq . Hence, there exists a unique Nash 
equilibrium in shipping lines’ port call decision. We solve (3.9) to obtain the best 
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(3.10) 
where superscript G stands for the generalized case. A similar expression holds for 
port 2. We focus on the solution range of greater than or equal to 0 and less than or 
equal to 1. If the solution falls outside this range, the solution will be at the boundary 
of the constraints.  
                                                            
10 Cournot behavior by congestible facility users, such as airlines and shipping lines, has been assumed 





We now conduct the comparative statics analysis to see the changes in shipping lines’ 
equilibrium with respect to the changes in parameters such as port capacity, price and 
transshipment level. Since the best response functions of shipping lines’ port call 
decision are identical across the shipping lines and depend only on the aggregate port 
calls at each port, we investigate the comparative statics of the shipping lines’ 
aggregate output at port 1 with respect to parameter set  1 2 1 2 1 2, , , , ,X K K g g  . 
The results are shown below and the details of derivations are given in Appendix B. 
1 1 1 1
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0,  0,  0,  0Q Q Q Q
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                                                                     (3.11) 
As shown in (3.11), the shipping lines’ aggregate output at port 1 decreases with port 
1’s price and port 2’s capacity, and increases with port 1’s capacity and port 2’s price. 
Similar results are obtained for 2Q . We further obtain the responses of aggregate 
shipping lines’ output at port 1 to transshipment level: 
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      (3.13) 
The positive rate of return in (3.12) is contingent on the shipping lines’ marginal profit 
at port 1 due to the increasing transshipment level of port 1. Similarly, the negative 
rate of return in (3.12) is dependent on the shipping lines’ marginal cost at port 1 that 
results from congestion due to increasing transshipment level of port 1. On the other 
hand, the positive rate of return in (3.13) is contingent on the shipping lines’ marginal 
cost at port 2 due to worsening congestion that results from increasing transshipment 
at port 2, while the negative rate of return in (3.13) is pegged to the shipping lines’ 





3.3.2 Stage one: Port Pricing Strategies 
The port pricing strategies are analyzed in the first stage of the game when both ports 
maximize their profits (3.8) by choosing port price r . The first-order condition is 
shown in (3.14), 
  0r rr r r
r r
FF O 
                                                                            (3.14) 
Based on shipping lines’ decision behavior obtained from stage two and analyzing 
ports’ profit functions, we can obtain Nash equilibrium port prices. However, the best-
response functions may not yield a closed form solution in this model. In this case we 
will, in the following sections, explore the results of the port pricing stage using 
numerical experiments. 
3.4 Ports Collusion and Social Optimum 
Thus far in this study, we had focused mainly on the non-cooperative game where 
every port and shipping line makes independent decisions to maximize own profit. We 
now consider the case of two ports cooperating on price, and of all market players, two 
ports and N-shipping line, cooperating to maximize the market profit. 
3.4.1 Ports Collusion Model 
Consider the case in which two ports decide their prices concurrently. The profit 
function of ports collusion model is shown in (3.15). 
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It is found that the partial derivatives are positive. The port price would approach 
infinity if no boundary for maximum port price is set. Thus we can observe that the 
port collusion model yields higher port price than that of the non-cooperative model. 
The result stems from the monopolistic power that the ports now possess, rendering 
them a free hand in escalating their prices to maximize their profits. Moving forward, 
this analysis would help better explain the competitive landscape and strategies among 
regionally bounded terminal operators.  
3.4.2 Social Optimum Model 
We now consider the social optimum model that reflects cooperation among all 
players in the game to maximize their combined profits. This is captured in the social-
welfare function (SW) given below: 
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A reduced form of (3.17) is presented by  
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It is important to note that the port price disappears from (3.17) to give (3.18). In this 
case, the port price is internalized due to the equality between total port revenue and 
sum of shipping lines’ port cost. Therefore, there is no pricing stage in this model, but 





port call decision in social optimum model is characterized by the first order condition 
below. 
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(3.19)                      
We solve (3.19) to achieve the best response of shipping lines’ port call decision 
below in (3.20). It depicts that in social optimum model, the shipping lines’ port call 
decision takes into account port operation cost in order to maximize overall profits. To 
better appreciate the model, we can perceive the stipulated conditions as a vertical 
expansion of shipping lines, where they extend their core businesses from liner 
shipping to terminal operation. In this case, social optimum model explains the 
structure of these shipping lines’ profit, where ports’ prices are internalized and ports’ 
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(3.20) 
3.5 Numerical Results 
In this section, the shipping lines’ port call decisions and port pricing strategies are 
further explored through numerical experiments. First, we explain the effect on 
shipping lines’ port call decision, driven by differing port prices between two ports 





transshipment level on shipping lines’ port call decision while applying various levels 
of port capacities. Third, we explore the changes in equilibrium port price in 
accordance with changes in capacities and transshipment levels. Finally, we compare 
the results of the social optimum model and non-cooperative model in terms of 
shipping lines’ port call decision and market profits. 
In addition, we assume that the transshipment levels and capacities of both 
ports are same in this case. In particular, we define “capacity utilization (CU)” for 
experiments. The capacity utilization is calculated based on possible maximum market 
demand, in which all shipping lines call at one port with their maximum port call. 
Then, the capacity utilization is computed by given (3.21), a ratio of maximum market 
demand to sum of two ports capacities. The higher CU signifies small capacity and the 
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Figure 3.2 shows shipping lines’ port call decision at port 1 subjected to differing 
prices between two equally-sized ports. 
 





As expected, similar port prices yield an equal portion of port calls to both ports. The 
portion of port calls to port 1 decreases as port 1’s price increases. This implies that 
shipping lines are easily attracted by a cheaper port price. Another important finding 
from Figure 3.2 is the combined effect of capacity and price level. Different slope 
gradients were obtained when different port capacities were subjected to similar price 
differentials (see CU=100% and CU=20%). While the capacity CU=100% carried a 
gentle slope, the capacity CU=20% resulted in the steep slope. These results showed 
that when both ports’ capacities are large, a marginal difference between two port 
prices is sufficient to drive significant demand to the cheaper port. In contrast, when 
both ports’ capacities are small, the shift of demand becomes inelastic to the difference 
in port prices. Therefore, it is reasonable to assume that the congestion effect 
associated with a small port capacity offsets the price difference between ports, and 
that a large port capacity offsets the congestion effect and hence amplifies the effect of 
price difference.  
 
 
Figure 3.3 Effect of transshipment and capacity levels on SLs’ port call decision 
Since gr is a factor that contributes to shipping lines’ transshipment demand, shipping 





However, this only holds true when the port capacity is sufficient to handle the 
additional transshipment demand and offset the congestion effect, which is shown at 
the intersection point between the curves in Figure 3.3. In other words, when the port 
capacity is small, the congestion effect takes precedence over the transshipment effect,  
hence resulting in the lower portion of port calls despite a higher gr. 
 
Figure 3.4 Equilibrium port prices while varying capacity differences 
We examine the equilibrium port price of port 1 and port 2 in the context of varying 
difference between two ports’ capacities. This perspective translates into port 
expansion in practice. As shown in figure 3.4, capacity expansion in either port will 
decrease the equilibrium port price. This finding can be interpreted as such: a larger 
port can aggressively lower its price to attract more demand as they are more likely to 
have spare capacity and hence less congestion. In response, the rival port has to lower 
its price as a countermeasure since its capacity level cannot retain its market share.  
Figure 3.5 shows the equilibrium port price subjected to differing 
transshipment level between two equally-sized ports. The Figure 3.5(a) and 3.5(b) 
show the equilibrium port price of port 1 and port 2 under given congested (CU=100%) 






(a) CU=100% (b) CU=20% 
 
Figure 3.5 Equilibrium port prices while varying transshipment level differences 
When both ports are congested, a high transshipment level is not preferred due to the 
higher congestion cost to shipping lines. Thus port 1 lowers its price to capture the 
port calls. On the other hand, when both ports are excessively large, the port that 
provides more transshipment is preferred. The excessive capacity surpasses the 
congestion effect, thus the port receives more port calls and in response, it increase its 
price. Meanwhile, the other port, in response of this situation, will lower its price to 
attract the shipping lines.  
 
(a) Port call decision (b) Profit 
 






In the previous analysis on the social optimum model, we found that the shipping lines’ 
port call decision depends on port capacity, transshipment level and port operation cost 
when port prices are internalized in the objective function. We now take our analysis 
further by comparing the non-cooperative model and the social optimum model. In this 
analysis, we give both models identical parameters and compare the resulting shipping 
lines’ port call decisions and total market profits. The conditions for this experiment 
are given as follow: 1 2 1 2 1 2 ,   and K K O O g g   . As shown in Figure 3.6(a), shipping 
lines make more port call at port 1 in the social optimum model than in the non-
cooperative model. The intuition behind this phenomenon is that under the social 
optimum condition, the shipping lines’ port call decision is bounded by the port 
operation cost; whereas in the non-cooperative model, the same decision is bounded 
by the port price. As assumed that the port price is always higher than the port 
operation cost, and considering the inverse relationship between the port call decision 
and the cost factors(port price and port operation cost), the shipping lines will thus  
make more port calls at port 1 under the social optimum condition. As seen in Figure 
3.6(b), the market profit of the social optimum model is greater than that of the non-
cooperative model. It is explained in shipping lines’ port call decision, where the port 
call diverted to port 1 in social optimum model is shown to be comparatively higher.  
3.6 Special Cases 
As our model is limited to numerical results for port pricing stage, in this section, we 
consider two cases that enable analytical work to achieve the best response function of 
port pricing stage. We found that the results obtained in these special cases are 





3.6.1 Same capacities and transshipment levels for both ports 
Thus far in this study, we have focused on the generalized case where the ports have 
different prices, capacities and transshipment levels. This case is complicated by the 
existence of possible combined effects among key factors. For this special case, we 
reduce the complexities by considering same capacities and transshipment levels for 
both ports, i.e. 1 2:K K K  and 1 2:g g g  , thus the ports are only differentiated 
from their prices. The best response function of port call decision made by shipping 
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where superscript S represents same capacities and transshipment levels for both ports. 
Expression (3.22) shows that allocating port call decision by shipping lines initially 
begins at the point 0.5, or half of maximum port call, as we have set 1 as the upper 
bound of port call. Thereafter, depending on the difference between port prices, the 
port call decision moves downward or upward. Based on (3.22) and the first order 
condition of port profit function (3.14), we can obtain the analytical results of the 
existence of Nash equilibrium in port prices and its uniqueness as shown in 
Propositions 1 and 2. 
Proposition 1.  Port r’s profit function r is strictly concave in r . 
Proof. See Appendix C.  
Proposition 2. Port competition has a unique equilibrium in port price  * * *1 2,   . 
Proof. See Appendix C. 
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3.6.2 Linear Congestion Delay Cost 
De Borger and Van Dender (2006) applied the linear volume-capacity ratio congestion 
costs function in their study. As they focused on interior solutions, their linear 
congestion function allows them to keep the analysis tractable while guaranteeing 
firms produce positive output in the duopoly case, and avoid the use of exogenous 
rationing rules. Similarly, we consider the linear congestion delay cost in this section 






                                                                                                       (3.24) 
We apply (3.24) to two-stage game instead of our quadratic congestion delay cost 
function (3.4). Solving (3.9) yields the best response functions of shipping lines’ port 
call decision at port 1: 
  
 
    
 
2
2 1 1 2 2 1 1 2 2 2 1 1
1 2 2 2 2 2
2 1 1 2 2 1 1 22
L
i
f g K g K g NK K K g p c g p c
q
g K g K N a g K g K N
                    (3.25)                     
where superscript L stands for linear congestion delay cost. Similar to same capacities 
and transshipment levels, based on (3.25) and the first order condition of port profit 
function (3.14), we found that this case also satisfies the Proposition 1 and 2, although 
the contract condition in Proposition 2 is bound to the condition, 1 22g g (See  
Appendix D). Hence, this case also guarantees that there exists the unique Nash 





port 1’s transshipment level. The best response function of port 1 can be obtained by 
substituting (3.25) into port 1’s first order condition (3.14), and solving for its price 1 . 
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A similar expression holds for 2
L . We apply comparative static analysis on (3.26) 
with respect to the port capacities. The effects of port capacities are shown in (3.27) 
and (3.28).                                                                                                          
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Expression (3.27) and (3.28) show similar results obtained from the numerical 
experiments that the equilibrium port price decreases with the port capacities of own 
and competitor. Explaining from the long term strategic perspective, port expansion in 
either port will decrease the equilibrium port prices.  
3.7 Conclusions 
This paper developed the two-stage duopoly model of container port competition 
focusing on transshipment demand. The linear container demand function, among 
others, was derived to facilitate a two-stage game analysis. In the main analysis, it was 
shown that shipping lines have a tendency to assign more port calls to the port that 
offers a cheaper price and a larger capacity. The port collusion model provided 
evidence that a monopolistic port market will result in an infinite port price, whereby 
in the social optimum model, the shipping lines’ decision in number of port calls is 





experiments were conducted to further our observation of the Nash equilibrium 
solution. Several key discoveries were made. First, the level of port capacity has a 
significant effect on other factors. The impact of price difference between two large 
ports is further heightened as congestion delay costs become insignificant. Shipping 
lines prefer the port that provides a higher transshipment level, only if its capacity is 
sufficient to eliminate the accompanying congestion effect. Next, from the port 
perspective, the port that has excessive capacity can cut the price to invite demand as 
its spare capacity can balance the congestion effect, and in response, the rival port 
needs to lower its price in order to maintain its competitiveness in the market. When 
both ports are congested, a high transshipment port lowers the price to retain its 
demand as its transshimment level results in high congestion cost to shipping lines. 
When comparing the non-cooperative model with the social optimum model, we 
showed that the internalized port price enables the social optimum model to achieve 
more port calls, and also higher market profit. Finally, some special cases were 
explored to increase the visibility on the best response functions and the existence of a 
unique Nash equilibrium in port prices. These special cases reduced the complexities 
in computation by considering (i) identical capacities and transshipment levels, and (ii) 
linear congestion delay cost function. Both cases guaranteed the existence of a unique 









Chapter 4 Nonlinear Transshipment Demand and Multiple Nash Equilibria 
Nonlinear Transshipment Demand and 
Multiple Nash Equilibria 
 
4.1 Overview 
This chapter extends our base model to a NTCD (nonlinear transshipment container 
demand). The numerical analysis shows that shipping lines may have a unique Nash 
equilibrium or multiple Nash equilibria in their port call decision. The conditions for 
either outcome are complicated with interaction among nonlinearity, port price, port 
capacity and transshipment level. Experimental results of Nash equilibrium port price 
show that a unique Nash equilibrium for port price exists only when shipping lines’ 
port call decision has a unique Nash equilibrium.  
This chapter is organized as follows: section 4.2 presents a NTCD function. 
The solution concept of the non-cooperative two-stage game is briefly explained in 
section 4.3. The intensive numerical analyses and findings are shown in section 4.4, 
and finally the conclusion is given in section 4.5. 
4.2  The model 
Consider two container transshipment ports, r =1, 2, which provide homogenous 





customers are two identical shipping lines, i =1, 2. Our NTCD function represents a 
number of transshipment containers which shipping line i  loads and unloads at port r . 
We give our focus on transshipment containers, thus our NTCD function does not take 
into account the gateway containers. 
      1,2;  1,2bir r ir rF g q Q i r                                                                         (4.1) 
where 0 1irq  , 1is irq q  for r s , rg  is nonnegative coefficient and b  is 
nonlinearity index. As defined in the previous chapter, irq  is a decision variable which 
indicates a fraction of transshipment port calls that shipping line i makes at port r, and 
is determined by the capacity of port r, its price and transshipment level during the 
stipulated period of time. The nonlinearity index b  can adjust transshipment effects, 
where ‘b = 0’ indicates no transshipment benefits from other shipping lines, whereas 
‘ 0 1b  ’ denotes the moderate transshipment volume, whereas ‘ 1b  ’ connotes the 
exaggerated transshipment volume. It is noted that when the nonlinearity index b   
becomes 1, rQ  gives a linear trend. Our interest in this part of study lies on brQ  as a 
nonlinear trend, thus the moderate and exaggerated transshipment volumes are 
considered. 
 We continue this study with the quadratic congestion delay cost function, 
which has been introduced in chapter 3, expression (3.5). The shipping lines’ profit 
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The first constraint in (4.2) shows that irq is normalized between 0 and 1. The second 
constraint shows that the given shipping lines’ maximum call size is 1. This will help 
to facilitate our analysis of the shipping lines’ allocation decision in response to the 
ports’ capacities, prices and transshipment levels. The third constraint is a capacity 
constraint and the fourth constraint is a nonnegative constraint that shipping lines only 
consider a positive profit. We continue our study with port objective function that 
introduced in the previous chapter, expression (3.9). 
4.3  Non-cooperative two-stage game 
Taking into account a NTCD function and the modified shipping lines’ profit function, 
we advance our analysis via two-stage game. As defined the stages earlier, ports, in the 
first stage, choose the price that maximize their profit and in the second stage, 
shipping lines make port call decision to maximize their profit, observing ports’ 
capacities, prices and transshipment levels.  
 Due to the NTCD function and the quadratic congestion delay cost 
function, it is not able to achieve the closed form solutions through the analytical work. 
Thus, we will explore shipping lines’ port call decision and ports’ optimal pricing 
through numerical experiments in the following section. In addition, our problem can 





Tucker formulation incorporates inequality and non-negative constraints by imposing 
additional restrictions on the first-order conditions for the problem, thus we consider 
the solution of Nash equilibrium problems by concatenating the KKT conditions of 
each shipping line’s optimization problem to evaluate the optimal size of port calls. 
Transforming shipping lines’ profit function to Lagrangian form and its conditions are 
shown in Appendix E.   
4.4 Numerical Analysis 
The numerical experiments are conducted by Matlab software program, where its 
optimization toolbox is developed based on KKT condition. The numerical 
experiments are structured on the basis of two-stage game; hence, the shipping lines’ 
port call decision will be explored first with given port conditions, and then the 
optimal port price will be found by searching method based on shipping lines’ decision 
behaviour.  
4.4.1 Shipping lines’ port call decision 
The numerical experiments are conducted for examining two symmetric shipping lines’ 
port call decision based on given port conditions. In particular, BRC (best response 
curve) method is adopted in this part of study since it is effective method to show the 
strategy which produces the most favourable outcome for a player, taking opponent’s 
strategy as given (Fudenberg and Tirole 1991). Before exploring numerical results, we 
will explain the details of how to interpret the BRCs and two characteristics of 







1) Best Response Curves 
BRCs can analyze and explain simultaneous decisions of competing players, and 
indicate the best decision based on the decision that the player expects its rival will 
make. In the graphical expression of BRCs, Nash equilibrium is found where players’ 
best-response curves intersect. That is a stable state of a situation in which no player 
can gain by a change of strategy as long as the other player remains unchanged. Figure 
4.1 shows the graphical illustration of two shipping lines’ port call decision BRCs at 
port 1. In particular, the x-axis represents shipping line 1’s port call strategies at port 1, 
while the y-axis represents shipping line 2’s port call strategies at port 1. Based on 
shipping line 2’s strategies as given information, shipping lines 1’s BRC is presented 
with solid line. Meanwhile, the shipping line 2’s BRC is presented with dotted line 
based on given strategies of shipping line 1. Then, the intersection of two curves 
indicates the Nash equilibrium. Specifically, the BRC can be studied as follow; if 
shipping line 1 gives its strategy ① (see Figure 4.1), shipping line 2’s BR is found on 
dotted line by following a vertical arrow. Then, shipping line 1 is taking this shipping 
line 2’s BR as a given opponent strategy and produces its BR on solid line (follow the 
horizontal arrow). By repeating this procedure, it eventually reaches to intersection of 
two BRCs, where it is called the Nash equilibrium. It shows the similar moves for 
shipping line 2 when it starts its move from ② and follows the arrows. 
2) Multiple Nash equilibria 
We now discuss about the Multiple Nash equilibria such as given in Figure 4.2.  
Shipping lines’ BRCs, as in this case, result in three Nash equilibria, two at the corner 
(0, 1), (1, 0) and one in the middle (0.5, 0.5). Such games with Multiple Nash 
equilibria in which players choose the same or corresponding strategies are regarded 






Figure 4.1 SLs’ BRCs with a Unique Nash Equilibrium 
From a mathematical point of view, selecting the “Best” Nash equilibrium is an 
important issue because it is approaching the coordination game as a problem that has 
to be solved by some restriction of the assumptions that would rule out the multiple 
equilibria. On the other hand, from a social scientific point of view, Multiple Nash 
equilibria may provide us a possible “explanation” of coordination problems which 
would be an important positive finding (McCain, 2010). With respect to these 
perspectives, we will study Multiple Nash equilibria from a mathematical point of 
view in the future. Instead, in this thesis, we will approach Multiple Nash equilibria 
from the latter point of view mentioned above. We first discuss about two interesting 
characteristics of Multiple Nash equilibria, i.e., stability and robustness.  
 Stability 
Multiple Nash equilibria can be classified into a stable or an unstable equilibrium. The 
unstable equilibrium means that a slight displacement from equilibrium departs further 
from the original equilibrium. On the contrary, a stable equilibrium suggests a slight 







Figure 4.2 Multiple Nash equilibria and Stability 
This can be observed in Figure 4.2; shipping line 1 decides to move from current 
equilibrium in the middle 0.5  to ①, and then shipping line 2 takes ① as a known 
opponent strategy and produces its BR on dotted line (the move follows vertical solid 
arrow). By repeating this procedure, it is noticed that this move rapidly leads to one of 
corner equilibria, (0, 1). For shipping line 2, it shows a similar result when it shifts its 
port call from 0.5 to ②, reaching to the other corner equilibrium (1, 0). This suggests 
that the two corner equilibria are stable while the centre equilibrium is unstable in this 
case. 
 






Robustness of Nash equilibrium is relevant to the probable region that would convert 
an initial strategy to the certain Nash equilibrium. Figure 4.3 shows three regions of 
initial strategies for shipping lines’ port call decision. For instance, any choice within 
the blue region will be directed to the equilibrium (0, 1) while being directed to the 
equilibrium (1, 0) within pink region. The centre equilibrium (0.5, 0.5) will be selected 
by the choice made at the boundary between blue and pink region. Therefore, the 
wider region gets in initial strategies the more chance to be selected.  
4.4.1.1 Symmetric ports conditions 
Given the existence of Multiple Nash equilibria and its characteristics, we first 
examine the shipping lines’ port call decision under the symmetric ports conditions, 
where the given ports’ capacities, prices and transshipment levels are 1 2:K K K  ,
1 2:    and 1 2:g g g  . By analysing symmetric port conditions first, we can 
clearly observe the impact of each port factor on shipping lines’ port call decision.  
1) Analysis on capacity K 
The port capacity is an important factor that has a direct influence on port congestion. 
The numerical experiments begin with given parameters of 0.5,  0.3,  0.3b g   . 
The various levels of port capacity are given based on CU (referring to expression 
(3.21)). The given ranges of CU cover between 20% and 100%. In order to calculate 
the CU, a possible maximum market demand has to be estimated. It can be obtained 
when both shipping lines call at the same port with their maximum port-of-call, i.e. 1. 
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Assuming two ports capacities are identical in this case, the symmetric port capacity 
level is determined in Table 4.1 in accordance with CU. In particular, a higher CU 
signifies small capacity, representing congested capacity level, while a lower CU 
indicates large capacity, representing excessive capacity level. 
Table 4.1 Symmetric port capacity levels 



















Shipping lines’ BRCs when given CU=100% is presented in Figure 4.4. In this case, a 
unique Nash equilibrium is found in the middle where the two BRCs are met.  
 






Figure 4.5 Trends of SL 2’s TS benefits, congestion cost and total profit when 11q =1 
Taking our analysis further, the effect of the congestion delay cost has been examined 
and given in Figure 4.5. In particular, we observe the trends of shipping line 2’ 
transshipment benefits, congestion delay cost and total profit while varying its port call 
decision at port 1. It is assumed that shipping line 1 only calls at port 1. The x-axis in 
Figure 4.5 indicates the port call strategies of shipping line 2 made at port 1, and the y-
axis signifies the value of shipping line 2’s transshipment benefits, congestion delay 
cost and total profit. The graph suggests that the shipping line 2 would achieve more 
transshipment demand by assigning more calls to port 1(see solid line). However, the 
congestion delay cost (dotted line) takes precedence over transshipment benefits; thus, 
the optimal port call that the shipping line 2 assigns to port 1 is around 0.04 where its 
total profit (dash-dotted line) is maximized. It is implied that a highly congested port 
has limited handling capacity; hence forcing shipping lines to allocate their port calls 
to both ports by matching the demand to capacity. This explains a trend of downward 





(a) CU=90% (b) CU=80% 
(c) CU=70% (d) CU=60% 
Figure 4.6 SLs’ downward sloping BRCs under various levels of symmetric capacities 
Increased port capacities result in Multiple Nash equilibria in shipping lines’ port call 
decision as shown in Figure 4.6. The BRCs in Figure 4.6(a)-(c) give the two corner 
equilibria (0, 1), (1, 0) and the mid-point equilibrium (0.5, 0.5).  The  mid-point 
equilibrium is the decision that shipping lines found a balance between transshipment 
benefits and congestion delay cost by assigning equal amount of port calls to both 
ports, while two corner equilibria are the decisions that shipping lines seek for 
minimum congestion delay cost by calling either port. It is implied that shipping lines 
avoid each other in order to reduce the congestion delay cost as it is predominant issue 
in this capacity level; therefore, the BRCs are downward sloping. Different gradients 
are obtained for the BRCs in Figure 4.6. It suggests that the larger capacity gets the 
faster convergence rate to the two corner equilibria, hence implying that the corner 





4.6(d), where the two new Nash equilibria appear between each corner and the mid-
point. The mid-point equilibrium in this case is considered stable while the two new 
Nash equilibria are unstable. It is due to the coefficient between BRCs. This will be 
explained further in the marginal analysis. 
(a) CU=50% (b) CU=40% 
(c) CU=30% (d) CU=20% 
Figure 4.7 SLs’ upward sloping BRCs under various levels of symmetric capacities 
Continuing our experiment on port capacity, further increased port capacity still 
delivered Multiple Nash equilibria in shipping lines’ port call decision. As observed in 
Figure 4.7, there are three Nash equilibria, the two corner equilibria (0, 0), (1, 1) and 
the mid-point equilibrium (0.5, 0.5). It is noticed that both shipping lines’ BRCs are 
becoming upward sloping. The trend of corner equilibria and upward sloping suggest 
that shipping lines now opt for transshipment volume by calling at the same port as an 
increase of excess capacity compensates the congestion effect. As studied previously 
in Figure 4.6, a similar trend is observed regarding the gradient of BRCs; the larger 





equilibria are stable and the mid-point is unstable equilibrium. Another observation 
made from Figure 4.7; there are five Nash equilibria in Figure 4.7 (a) and (b). Aside 
two corner equilibria and mid-point equilibrium, two more equilibria occur between 
each corner and mid-point. The mid-point equilibrium in both cases is stable while two 
new Nash equilibria are unstable.  
Figure 4.6(d) and, Figure 4.7(a) and (b) have presented a rare five Multiple 
Nash equilibria. Such an occurrence is speculated that these cases represent a 
transition stage of BRCs’ relationship from negative to positive. It is suspected that 
there might be a discrete movement on the shipping lines’ port call decision. These 
cases need to be further explored for deeper insights. However, as our interests lie on 
capturing main trends in this study, we will consider further examination on this 
phenomenon in the future study.  
Based on our observation through the numerical analyses, we define three 
types of Nash equilibrium solutions.  
 Unique Strategy 
: There is only one Nash equilibrium solution for shipping lines’ port call 
decision. 
 Exclusive Strategy 
: Shipping lines assign considerable amount of port call at different port in 
order to reduce the congestion delay cost. As congestion delay cost is 
predominant issue in this capacity level, transshipment benefit in this strategy 







 Inclusive Strategy 
: Shipping lines opt for same port to achieve the transshipment benefit as much 
as possible. In this case, the transshipment benefit is more significant than 
congestion delay cost.  
Table 4.2 Summary of port call strategy under various symmetric capacities 
CU(%) Capacity Level 
SLs’  
port call decision 
No.of 
Nash Equilibrium 











Excess capacity Inclusive strategy 
3 
Based on the definition given above, the numerical results of symmetric port capacity 
are summarized in Table 4.2. It is found that a unique Nash equilibrium solution exists 
when both ports are very congested. However, as port capacity increases, shipping 
lines have Multiple Nash equilibria in their port call decision. ‘Congested capacity’ 
discourages shipping lines’ transshipment-prone behaviour as congestion delay cost is 
more significant than transshipment benefits. On the other hand, ‘Excess capacity’ 
encourages shipping lines’ transshipment-prone behaviour since congestion delay cost 
is less of their concerns due to the spare capacity.  
2) Analysis on nonlinearity b 
Our numerical experiment runs based on the moderate transshipment effect, i.e. 
0.5b  . Nonetheless, we assess the case of 2b  , where the transshipment benefit is 
obtained by squaring rQ , representing an exaggerated case of transshipment effect. In 





level of capacity utilization for both ports, i.e. CU=70%, for the consistency of 
experiments. As shown in Figure 4.8, the transshipment effect of b=0.5 is not as 
significant as of b=2. The transshipment benefit and congestion delay cost of b=2 are 
computed with one of stable Nash equilibrium (0.8, 0.8); the values are obtained 0.18 
and 0.05, respectively. If we enforce shipping lines to make the same decision with 
b=0.5, the transshipment benefit and the congestion delay cost for shipping lines are 
computed respectively 0.09 and 0.1, where the transshipment benefit is less than 





Figure 4.8 SLs’ BRCs under different transshipment effects  
 
 





Figure 4.9 summarizes shipping lines’ Nash equilibrium strategies under different 
transshipment effect and various capacity levels. The Inclusive Strategy mostly occurs 
when b=2, where the transhipment effect is amplified exponentially. It is implied that 
shipping lines are willing to crowd at the same port due to the high profit made by 
additional transshipment volume, in spite of the high congestion cost. 
3) Analysis on port price μ  
Considering Figure 4.10 as the comparison base case, where the given input 
parameters are CU=80%, 0.3g   and 0.3  , increased port price by 30% resulted in 
Figure 4.11(b). It is noticed that this result is similar to Figure 4.11(a), where the port 
capacity is reduced to CU=100%. On the other hand, decreased port price by 30% 
yields Figure 4.11(d). It is also noticed that this result is similar to Figure 4.11(c), 
where the port capacity is increased to CU=70%. These results suggest that lowering 
port price has a similar effect as increasing port capacity. In other words, increasing 
port price has a same effect as decreasing port capacity.  From the shipping lines’ 
perspective, their interest is in not only maximizing own profit but also minimizing 
cost components. Therefore, shipping lines’ cost including port price and congestion 
delay cost can be reduced by selecting a cheaper and larger port.  
 






(a) CU=100% (b) µ increased by 30% 
  
(c) CU=70% (d) µ decreased by 30% 
Figure 4.11 Comparison of base case with changes in symmetric capacities and prices 
The results of this experiment are summarized in Table 4.3. Increased port price 
extends the range of capacity level to yield a Unique Strategy, while decreased port 
price gives more capacity levels to opt for Inclusive Strategy. It is presumed that 
shipping lines are willing to tolerate the congestion delay cost due to the cheaper port 
price. 
1) Analysis on transshipment level g  
Continuing the experiment with comparison base case (Figure 4.10), we now explore 
the effect of transshipment level to shipping lines’ port call decision. Increased 
transshipment level by 10% gives Figure 4.12(b) while decreased transshipment level 





Table 4.3 Summary of port call strategy under changes in symmetric prices 
CU(%) 
Port call strategy 
µ 
Increased by 30% Base case 
µ 














Inclusive Strategy 30% 
20% 
 
It is noticed that Figure 4.12(b) is similar to Figure 4.12(a), where the port capacity is 
reduced to CU=90% and Figure 4.12(d) is similar to Figure 4.12(b), where the port 
capacity is increased to CU=70%. Based on our NTCD function, a higher 
transshipment level leads to a higher transshipment volume, thus contributing to an 
increase of port congestion. This implies that a higher transshipment level gives a 
similar effect of decreasing port capacity. The overall results of this experiment are 
summarized in Table 4.4. Increased transshipment level generates more demand, 
hence tightening port capacity and resulting in the Unique Strategy. Decreased 
transshipment level gives spare space to loosen the congestion. Therefore, shipping 
lines opt for Inclusive Strategy as the congestion delay cost is insignificant compared 
to transshipment benefits. 
To conclude the numerical analysis of shipping lines’ port call decision 
under symmetric port conditions, the cheaper port price and the lower transshipment 
level contribute to cost-saving for shipping lines, hence encouraging shipping lines to 






(a) CU=90% (b) g increased by 10% 
  
(c) CU=70% (d) g decreased by 10% 
Figure 4.12 Comparison of base case with changes in symmetric capacities and TS levels 
Table 4.4 Summary of port call strategy under changes in symmetric TS levels 
CU(%) 
Port call strategy 
g  
Increased by 10% Base case 
g  
Decreased by 10% 
100% Unique Strategy Unique Strategy 
Exclusive Strategy 
90% 
Exclusive Strategy 80% 
Exclusive Strategy 70% 60% 
Inclusive Strategy 
50% 
Inclusive Strategy 40% Inclusive Strategy 30% 
20% 
2) Marginal Analysis 
Some theoretical works have been achieved based on marginal analysis in this section. 





equilibrium, the mid-point equilibrium (0.5, 0.5) is always obtained. Therefore, we can 
build Theorem 1. 
Theorem 1. The mid-point (0.5, 0.5) is always a Nash Equilibrium under the 
symmetric port conditions.  
Theorem 1 can be easily proved by solving one of shipping line’s optimal port call 
decision with given rival’s port call strategy,  *1 0.5 0.5iq  . A solution of Multiple 
Nash equilibria in this section shows mainly two trends, i.e. downward and upward 
sloping. These two trends of Multiple Nash equilibria represent an Exclusive and 
Inclusive port call strategy. Based on different two corner equilibria, we develop the 
below lemmas. 
Lemma 2. (1, 0) is not a Nash Equilibrium for shipping lines’ port call decision if 
 2 27K ag p c    . 
Proof. See Appendix F. 
Lemma 3. (1, 1) is not a Nash Equilibrium for shipping lines’ port call decision if 
 2 288 5K ag p c    . 
Proof. See Appendix G. 
Lemma 2 shows the lower bound of capacity condition for Exclusive Strategy, while 
Lemma 3 gives the lower bound of capacity condition for Inclusive Strategy. It is 
inferred that the lower bound of capacity condition for Exclusive Strategy is the upper 
bound of capacity condition for Unique Strategy, whilst the lower bound of capacity 
condition for Inclusive Strategy is the upper bound of capacity condition for Exclusive 





conditions for port call decision being led to different Nash equilibrium solutions and 
this can be described in Theorem 2. 
Theorem 2. There exist the threshold capacity levels that lead shipping lines’ port call 
decision to the different Nash equilibrium solutions. 
Finally, we study a stability of Nash equilibrium by marginal analysis. There exists the 
interaction between two shipping lines’ move and this provides the criteria to evaluate 
the equilibrium stability. This is summarized in Theorem 3. 
Theorem 3 (Stability).  A Nash Equilibrium (0.5, 0.5) is stable if the coefficient 
between shipping lines’ move on BRCs is less than 1, and is unstable if the coefficient 
between shipping lines’ move on BRCs is greater than 1. 
Proof. See Appendix H. 
Based on Theorem 3, we are now able to explain the phenomenon observed in Figure 
4.6(d), 4.7(a) and 4.7(b), where the 5 Nash equilibria and the stable mid-point 
equilibrium were found. 
4.4.1.2 Asymmetric ports conditions 
This section studies shipping lines’ port call decision when the given two port 
capacities, prices and transshipment levels are different.  
1) Analysis on capacity 1 2K > K  
Considering the given parameters 0.5,  0.3,  0.3b g   , we assume 1 2K K . Let
 1 21 2 1 K KK K   , where 1 2K K indicates the capacity difference between two ports. 





2K  are calculated with relation to 20% difference for every range of CU. Testing 
capacity levels for both ports are given in Table 4.5.  
Table 4.5 Asymmetric port capacity levels 
CU(%) 1 2
K K =20% 




























Figure 4.13 shows shipping lines’ BRCs under asymmetric ports capacities with 
various levels of CU. Figure 4.13(a) shows a unique Nash equilibrium for shipping 
lines’ port call decision, where it found the Nash equilibrium at (0.54, 0.54). It is 
expected that the port 1 receives more port calls as its capacity is 20% larger than port 
2’s. Figure 4.13(b)~(d) give the downward sloping Multiple Nash equilibria, where 
these yield the Exclusive Strategy. Two corner equilibria which are stable in these 
BRCs suggest that the congestion issue is more concerned than transshipment benefits. 
Even though the mid-point equilibrium is unstable, it gives an increasing trend of 
equilibrium point as the level of CU increases. At CU=50%, shipping lines reached the 
capacity level that they can immediately opt for port 1 with their maximum port of 
calls. Figure 4.13(g) and (h) show the upward sloping Multiple Nash equilibria. The 




























Another observation from Figure 4.13 (g) shows that the region to be converted to (1, 
1) is wider than to (0, 0) due to the 20% larger capacity of port1. However, further 
increased capacity led to a similar size of region for two corner equilibria to be 
converted. This implies that when both ports’ capacities are large, capacity difference 
does not have much impact on shipping lines’ decision. The overall experiment results 
are summarized in Table 4.6. It is noticed that the transition stage between Exclusive 
Strategy and Inclusive Strategy is identified at CU=50%. This transition stage of 
capacity level is resulted in Unique Strategy as given ports capacities are different, 
hence shipping lines’ preference is apparent.  
Table 4.6 Summary of port call strategy under asymmetric capacities 
CU(%) 
Port call strategy 
1 2
20%K K   
100% Unique Strategy 
90% 
Exclusive Strategy 80% 70% 
60% 
50% Unique Strategy 
40% 




2) Analysis on price 1 2μ < μ  
Based on given parameters of 1 20.5, 0.3,  :b g K K K    , we assume 1 2  . It is 
further assumed that port 2’s price is constant while varying port 1’s price. It defines
1 21 2
(1 )     , where 1 2  indicates price difference between two ports. Figure 
4.14 shows the BRCs when the price difference between two ports is 20%. When both 
ports are very congested, CU=100%, the shipping lines find a unique Nash equilibrium 
at (0.57, 0.57) in Figure 4.14(a). It is expected that port 1 receives more calls as its 




























1 2  =20% (b) 1 2  =40% 
 
Figure 4.15 SLs’ BRCs with different levels of price difference at CU=20% 
Observing trends of BRCs in Figure 4.14, the results are apparent that as port capacity 
increases, the effect of price difference becomes amplified. Figure 4.15, where it 
compared 20% and 40% price difference when CU=20%, shows that the increase of 
price difference immediately drives the shipping lines’ port call decision to port 1 with 
their maximum port of call (1, 1). The numerical results are summarized in Table 4.7. 
Table 4.7 Summary of port call strategy under asymmetric prices  
CU(%) 





100% Unique Strategy 
Exclusive Strategy 
90% 
Exclusive Strategy 80% 70% 
60% 
50% Unique Strategy 
Unique Strategy 40% 30% Inclusive Strategy 20% 
To conclude, the results obtained in this section suggest that when both ports’ 
capacities are small, the shift of demand becomes inelastic to the difference in port 
prices. In contrast, when the both ports’ capacities are excessively large, a marginal 
difference between two port prices is sufficient to drive significant demand to the 





with a small port capacity offsets the price difference between ports, and that a large 
port capacity offsets the congestion effect and hence amplifies the effect of price 
differences. 
3) Analysis on transshipment level 1 2g > g  
Having observed in the symmetric condition, rg  has an immediate influence on port 
demand level, therefore contributing to congestion level. Conducting numerical runs 
based on given parameters of 1 20.5, 0.3,  :b g K K K    , let 1 2g g and define 
 1 21 2 1 g gg g    where 1 2g g indicates transshipment difference between two ports.  
The numerical results shown in Figure 4.16 is perceived the trend of BRCs 
while 1 2g g with respect to various levels of CU. The main trends observed in this 
case are two-fold: first, when the given port capacity is small, the congestion effect 
takes precedence over the transshipment effect, hence receiving less port calls. The 
reason behind this is a higher transshipment level increases congestion delay costs for 
shipping lines. Second, as given port capacity becomes larger, shipping lines are 
inclined to make more port calls at the port that provides a higher gr . It is because the 
congestion delay cost is less than the profit generated through transshipment level. The 
BRCs in this experiment show the smiliar result found in different capacities and 
prices. The higher transshipment level with the smaller capacities associated with 
congestion effect leads to a unique Nash equilibrium, while with the larger capacities, 
































Figure 4.17 SLs’ BRCs with different levels of TS differences at CU=20% 
The difference of transshipment level between ports gets larger when CU=20%, as 
given in Figure 4.17, it immediately drives all shipping lines’ port call decision to port 
1 that has a higher transshipment level. Table 4.8 summarizes port call strategies and 
specific equiligrium points in this numerical runs.  
Table 4.8 Summary of port call strategy under asymmetric TS levels  
CU(%) 1 2
20%    1 2 40%    
Port call strategy NE points Port call strategy NE points 
100% Unique Strategy (0.4866, 0.4866) 
Unique Strategy 
(0.4662, 0.4662) 
90% (0.4964, 0.4964) (0.4798, 0.4798) 
80% 
Exclusive Strategy 
 (0.5144, 0.5144) 
(0,1) (1,0) (0.4997, 0.4997) 
70%  (0.5542, 0.5542) (0,1) (1,0) 
Exclusive 
Strateegy 
 (0.5345, 0.5345) 
(0.05,1) (1, 0.051) 
60%  (0.6531, 0.6531) (0,1)(1,0) 
 (0.6113, 0.6113) 
(0.1, 1) (1, 0.1) 
50% 
 (0.8626, 0.8626) 
(0.5515,1) 
 (1, 0.5515) 
 (0.7475, 0.7475) 
(0.45,1) (1, 0.45) 
40% Unique Strategy (1,1)  (0.9, 0.9545) (0.85, 1) (1, 0.85) 
30% 
Inclusive Strategy 
 (0.1116, 0.1116) 
(0,0) (1,1) Unique Strategy 
(1,1) 







4.4.2 Port Pricing Strategies 
So far, we have conducted umpteen numerical experiments for shipping lines’ port call 
decision. As defined in our two-stage game approach, a port pricing stage is solved 
with obtaining shipping lines’ port call decision. However, we have witnessed the 
existence of Multiple Nash equilibria in shipping lines’ port call decision, which it 
makes difficult to study port pricing stage. The selection criteria or method needs to be 
developed for Multiple Nash equilibria; however it is not in our scope of research. 
Therefore, we only study the port pricing stage with the case in which unique Nash 
equilibrium in shipping lines’ port call decision exists. Numerical analysis for port 
price is conducted by Matlab program. Its code for searching port price and the 
searching logic are given in Appendix I. We refer to given parameters from Figure 4.4, 
0.5,  0.3,  0.3b g    and 0.4243K  , and behaviour of shipping lines’ port call 
decision for this experiment. 
 





Figure 4.18 shows the BRCs of both ports’ prices. Due to the limitation of the 
numerical runs, the BRCs are not smooth. However, it is still able to present the 
unique Nash equilibrium in port pricing, where it is placed at (0.16, 0.16). Further 
experiments have shown that when either port operation cost or capacity marginal cost 
is raised in both ports, it results in the higher Nash equilibrium price. By cause of the 
limited numerical runs, the Nash equilibrium of port prices is searched only for the 
symmetric port conditions.  
4.5 Conclusions 
This chapter has extended the demand function to nonlinear, while accounting for the 
market structure of two ports and two shipping lines. The objective of applying the 
NTCD function was to capture the shipping lines’ preference towards transshipment 
volume that was not observed in LTCD function. Intensive numerical analyses were 
performed to investigate this behaviour due to the limitation of analytical feasibility 
(the absence of a closed form solution). In particular, the BRC method has effectively 
captured the results of unique or Multiple Nash equilibria in shipping lines’ port call 
decision. Using the characteristics of equilibria, we were able to define the three types 
of port call strategies: Unique Strategy, Exclusive Strategy and Inclusive Strategy. The 
behaviour of shipping lines towards key factors, i.e. port capacity, price and 
transshipment level, is similar to the findings from linear demand case. However, there 
are a few more interesting points found in this study. 
1 The shipping lines’ concern on transshipment volume is magnified with 
excessively large capacities. In this case, the shipping lines’ interest is in 





2 In the event of excessive capacity, small differences in prices or transshipment 
levels between competing ports are sufficient to incentivize shipping lines to 
switch from one port to the other. 
3 In the event of limited capacity where congestion occurs, shipping lines would 
prefer to ignore transhipment benefits and spread their container load across 













Chapter 5 Analysis on Asymmetric Shipping lines 
Analysis on Asymmetric Shipping lines 
 
5.1  Overview 
Continued with our model and NTCD function, this chapter attempts to explore the 
behaviour of asymmetric shipping lines. It is assumed that there is one large and one 
small shipping line in the market in terms of their maximum call size. A different 
pricing strategy to asymmetric shipping lines is proposed in order to observe the 
demand driving force. Due to the complexity of the problem, studying the port pricing 
stage is very limited. Therefore, the numerical analysis focuses on shipping lines’ port 
call decision and regards port price as given.  
The remaining parts of this chapter are organized as follows: section 5.2 
presents modified profit functions for asymmetric shipping lines and ports. Section 5.3 
demonstrates the results of numerical analyses and section 5.4 concludes this chapter.  
5.2 The model 
A port in the real operation offers different prices to different shipping lines. The main 
reason behind this is due to the different demand driving force from different shipping 
lines (or alliances). Those who have a strong demand driving force are the vital 
customer for port since these customers enable the port to secure the certain level of 





Maersk line (it is the world largest shipping line that has an absolute demand driving 
force) shifted to PTP was 40% lower port price offered by PTP. Thus, in this study, we 
assume that ports offer the different prices to different shipping lines, and investigate 
the behaviour of shipping lines towards the prices and transshipment benefits. The port 
price is now defined by ir  for i =1, 2 and r =1, 2, where i and r indicating the 
shipping lines and the ports, respectively. Accompanying with proposed port price, the 
profit function for shipping lines can be modified to (5.1).  
 2
1
max  1,2ii i i r r ir
r
p c D F i 

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                                                                  (5.1) 
It is assumed that each shipping line has a different container charge ip , operation cost 
ic  and total port call size in . As size of total port call increases, it is expected 
economies of scale in shipping lines’ container charge and operation cost. Thus, it is 
reasonable to assume that a large shipping line has relatively lower profit margin but 
also lower operation cost. The port profit function with different pricing for each 
shipping line is updated to (5.2).  
 2
1
1,2ir r r ir r r
r
O F m K i








5.3 Numerical analysis 
As witnessed in the chapter 4, the complexity that generated by nonlinearity of 
functions makes our model unable to obtain any analytical properties. Therefore, 
similar to previous chapter, we will continue our exploration through numerical 
analyses. So far in this thesis, a non-cooperative two-stage game has been employed as 
a solution method.  However, due to the existence of Multiple Nash equilibria in 
shipping lines’ port call decision, studying port pricing stage is very limited; hence we 
will not examine the stage for Nash equilibrium port price in this chapter.  Our 
numerical analysis totally focuses on capturing the behaviour of shipping lines’ port 
call decision. 
5.3.1 Asymmetric Shipping lines’ Port Call Decision 
The assumption is made that shipping line 1 and 2 represents a large shipping line and 
a small shipping line, respectively. A large shipping line’s total port call size is given 
to be double compared to small shipping line’s total port call size, i.e. 1 22,  1n n  . 
Furthermore, existence of economies of scale allows a large shipping line to lower its 
container charge and operation cost; therefore, 1 2p p  and 1 2c c . The BRCs present 
the shipping lines’ port call decision at port1. 
5.3.1.1 Symmetric port conditions 
We first examine shipping lines’ port call decisions when both ports offer same port 
capacities, prices and transshipment levels, where 1 2:K K K  , 1 2:    and





1) Analysis on capacity K 
With given parameters of 0.5,  0.3,  0.3b g   , a similar approach from previous 
chapter, expression (3.21), is used to calculate the various levels of port capacity. The 
maximum market demand is estimated below and the symmetric port capacity levels 
are defined in Table 5.1 in accordance with CU.  
2
1




         
Table 5.1 Symmetric port capacity levels for ASLs 



















Asymmetric shipping lines’ BRCs with respect to given CU are shown in Figure 5.1. 
From very congested to excessive capacity, the BRCs show the major trend of Unique 
Strategy (a), Exclusive Strategy (b)-(d) and Inclusive Strategy (g)-(h). It seems Figure 
5.1(e) and Figure 5.1(f) depicts a transition stage of BRCs converting from downward 
sloping to upward sloping. The five Nash equilibria are found in Figure 5.1(c)-(e), 
where the mid-point equilibrium becomes stable. Figure 5.1(g) and (h) suggest that 
when the capacity is large enough to handle the both shipping lines’ demand, shipping 



























2) Analysis on price   
Figure 5.2 shows the shipping lines’ BRCs when the given parameters are CU=80%, 
0.3g  and 0.3  . It is resulted in downward sloping Multiple Nash equilibria, hence 
perceiving Exclusive strategy. Based on this result, we now test the impact of different 
levels of port price on asymmetric shipping lines’ decision. 
 
Figure 5.2 Comparison base case: CU=80%, g =0.3,  = 0.3 
The outcome of increased port price from base case is shown in Figure 5.3(b). This is 
greatly similar to Figure 5.3 (a), which is a result of decreasing port capacity from base 
case. On the other hands, a decrease of port price from the base case generates a 
similar BRCs to Figure 5.3(c), where the port capacity is increased to CU=70%. To 
sum up, a rise of port capacity and a reduction of port price attribute similar trends to 







(a) CU=100% (b) Price increased by 40% 
(c) CU=70% (d) Price decreased by 10% 
 
Figure 5.3 Comparison of base case with changes in symmetric capacities and prices 
 
 
3) Analysis on transshipment level g 
Continued the numerical experiment with Figure 5.2, we now investigate the impact of 
different transshipment levels on asymmetric shipping lines’ port call decision. As 
given in Figure 5.3 and Figure 5.4, the BRCs are largely the same. An increase of 
transshipment level by 30% from the base case led to similar BRCs in Figure 5.4(a), 
where the port capacity is decreased to CU=100%. On the other hand, decreased 
transshipment level yielded the result shown in Figure 5.4(d). This is similar to Figure 
5.4(c), where the port capacity is increased to CU=70%. It can be concluded same as 
price analysis, i.e. an expansion of port capacity and a reduction of transshipment level 






(a) CU=100%   (b) TS increased by 30% 
  
(c) CU=70%   (d) TS decreased by 10% 
 
Figure 5.4 Comparison of base case with changes in capacities and TS levels 
 
5.3.1.2 Asymmetric port conditions 
In this section, asymmetric shipping lines’ behaviour is explored with asymmetric port 
conditions, i.e. 1 2K K , 1 2g g  and ir .   
1) Analysis on 1 2K > K  
Port 1’s capacity is set to be 20% higher than port 2’s in this experiment. It is observed 
that a larger capacity difference between two ports results in the faster convergence 
rate to the equilibrium point. Figure 5.5 shows the trend of shipping lines’ decision 
behaviour towards larger capacities. Shipping lines’ preference on port 1 is apparent as 
congestion is eased by larger capacity. However, it is given in Figure 5.6 that when 













(a) CU=100%  (b) CU=80% 
 
(c) CU=60%  (d) CU=40% 





2) Analysis on 1 2g > g  
Port 1’s transshipment level is set to be 20% higher than that of port 2 in this 
numerical run. A highly congested port capacity yields a unique Nash equilibrium as 
given in Figure 5.7(a). It is expected that the port 1 receives less port calls due to its 
high transshipment level which contributes to congestion at port. Figure 5.7(b) and (c) 
suggest the Exclusive Strategy while Figure 5.7(d) perceives that now the capacity is 
large enough to offset the congestion effect caused by high transshipment level. Thus, 
shipping lines opt for port 1 and enjoy the transshipment benefits by calling at the 
same port. The further increased capacity such as CU=20% (see Figure 5.8) gives a 
result similar to Figure 5.7(d). The positive effects of transshipment become more 
apparent in this case. 
 
  
(a) CU=100%  (b) CU=80% 
 
(c) CU=60%  (d) CU= 40% 






Figure 5.8 ASLs’ BRCs when 1 2g > g  at CU=20% 
3) Analysis on differentiated prices, ir   
We now study the proposed pricing strategy, where two ports are offering different 
prices to asymmetric shipping lines. Amongst possible combinations, our interest lies 
on exploring the cases appeared in Table 5.2. It is expected to observe the demand 
driving force leading by each shipping line.  
Table 5.2 Experimental cases for proposed pricing strategy to ASLs 








1 2   
 
There is an attempt to direct shipping lines to either port by proposed price setting. 
Next, it is believed that there exist the transshipment benefits that could lead shipping 
lines to make a choice over the cheaper price. Therefore, hereby we can define the 
demand driving force in our study as a pulling power that one shipping line 
successfully convinces the other shipping line to choose the port over the price 
advantage. Shipping lines’ decision will be made by comparing the marginal profit 
from cheaper port price and the marginal profit from a balance between transshipment 
benefit and congestion delay cost. An additional assumption is made for experiment 






(a) Pricing A   (b) Pricing B 
 
Figure 5.9 ASLs’ BRCs under proposed pricing strategies at CU=90% 
  
(a) Pricing A   (b) Pricing B 
 
Figure 5.10 ASLs’ BRCs under proposed pricing strategies at CU=30% 
Figure 5.9 represents asymmetric shipping lines’ BRCs with given port capacity 
CU=90%, which is very congested. Hence, shipping lines call for either port because 
the marginal profit from cheaper port price is higher than the marginal profit from a 
balance between transshipment benefits and congestion delay cost. For instance, in 
Figure 5.9(a), when the large shipping line opts for port 1 due to the cheaper price, this 
could be a good opportunity for small shipping line to benefit from the large shipping 
line’s transshipment demand. However, in this capacity level, the congestion takes 
precedence over the transshipment benefits if small shipping line calls at port 1; hence 






Figure 5.10 shows a more desirable situation to observe the transshipment-prone 
behaviour in shipping lines’ port call decision. As congestion is less inhibiting factor 
in this level of capacity, i.e. CU=30%, shipping lines now have an option to compare 
the price advantages and the transshipment benefits. Particularly, in Figure 5.10(a), 
small shipping line has an opportunity to compare the profit margin obtained from 
cheaper price (port2) and that from transshipment benefit (port1). The result shows 
that small shipping line chooses port 1 in spite of cheaper price in port 2. A similar 
decision process is made by large shipping line in Figure 5.10(b). A large shipping line 
compares the profit margin obtained from cheaper price (port 2) and that from 
transshipment benefit (port 1). However, the result is different from 5.10(a) that the 
large shipping line’s profit margin from both cheaper price and transshipment benefit 
is fairly compatible. This means a pulling power by small shipping line is not as strong 
as large shipping line’s. Therefore, we can conclude that the large shipping line has an 
absolute demand driving force than that of small shipping line. 
To sum up, the findings from this analysis imply that if the port 
successfully lures large shipping line, its demand driving force automatically pulls 
small shipping line to the same port.  
5.4 Conclusion 
In this chapter, we have examined asymmetric shipping lines’ port call decision. The 
asymmetric shipping lines’ behaviours towards port capacity, price and transshipment 
level have shown trends that are largely similar to what we have found in the previous 
chapter. However, we have uncovered some interesting results in the scenario where 





1 Large shipping lines possess a stronger demand driving force than that of small 
shipping lines.  
2 Small shipping lines prefer the opportunity to obtain more transhipment 
demand over a cheaper port price. This preference stems from the increased 
probability to achieve transhipment benefits from larger shipping lines. 
Based on the above findings, we can propose the following port strategies with respect 
to the preferences of asymmetric shipping lines. 
1 Port operators can effectively retain the market share for transhipment 
containers by attracting large shipping lines. The presence of large shipping 
lines would in turn draw smaller shipping lines to the port. 
2 Provide differentiated port prices to large shipping lines to cater for their high 
sensitivity towards port pricing. 
3 The assurance of excessive operational capacity or prioritized service to 













Chapter 6 Conclusions 
Conclusions 
 
6.1 Conclusions of the Study 
This thesis investigates the competition between transshipment container ports. To 
approach this problem, an analytical model that focuses on transshipment container 
demand is developed. In particular, multiple functions are created to examine the 
interdependency among shipping lines when determining port demand. These 
functions provide enhanced visibility on the decision making of shipping lines when 
selecting a transshipment port-of-call. Due to the complexity of the model, the 
analytical study of this thesis is limited to LTCD case. The study based on NTCD 
function relies much on numerical experiments. Practical implementation, moreover, 
is not applicable in this thesis due to the insufficient real data and also difficulty in 
measuring qualitative factor such as transshipment level which represent connectivity 
of feeder networks. Therefore, the numerical experiments are conducted based on 
simplified data sets. We leverage on a two-stage game model to generate additional 
insights to the responses of shipping lines amid various scenarios. These findings will 
enable transshipment ports to strategize accordingly for port demand optimization. 
Beyond these, we vary the symmetry of the shipping lines calling on transshipment 
ports and uncovered the different behaviours of large and small shipping lines in 





pricing and benefits strategies so as to entrench shipping lines of different sizes. 
Overall, the contributions of our study can be summarized as follows. 
1 Developed the model which characterized the transshipment container 
demand and showed that the model is a valid predictor of the various 
decisions undertaken by the shipping lines and ports within a transshipment 
port competition setting. 
2 Showed the Multiple Nash Equilibria in shipping lines’ port call decision 
that explains the decision making amid dynamic market situations. 
3 Provided ports the possible strategies to deal with asymmetric shipping 
lines based on the information of different interests in asymmetric shipping 
lines.  
6.2 Future Research 
This study is a first step towards the decoding of the competitive landscape of regional 
competing transshipment ports. Beyond the factors of port size, efficiency and pricing 
that were addressed in this thesis; future research can include key determinants such as 
government policies, port operating models, hinterland compositions, local market 
synergies, and regional feeder networks. A more in-depth understanding on how these 
determinants interact to derive the market share and profitability can help 
transshipment ports better understand their competitive landscape and, more 
importantly, formulate the right strategies to maximize profits in face of intense 
regional competition. Hence, the practical benefits of the research extended to existing 






From the viewpoint of methodological analysis, Multiple Nash equilibria found in 
shipping lines’ port call decision can be studied further in terms of its selection criteria 
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Proof of Lemma 1 
From (3.2),(3.3),(3.4),(3.5), we obtain 
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Derivations of comparative statics for shipping lines’ port call decision 
 
Let  1 2 1 2 1 2, , , , ,X K K g g   
thus,  *1 1i iq q X  







   
Applying the total differential implicit function and chain rule, differentiate (3.9) with 
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    (A.4) 
From the properties of demand in (3.2) and (3.3), expression (A.4) can be written as:
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 (A.6)  
Using (3.9) to derive 2 1i iq X   , we obtain: 
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Same capacities and transshipment levels for both ports 
Proof of Proposition 1 
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The second order derivate for port 1’ profit with respect to its price is given below. 
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Therefore, 1 is concave in 1 . Similar result can be obtained for port 2.                        
Proof of Proposition 2 
To prove uniqueness of port price, the contraction condition (Milgrom and Roberts, 
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We can get the second order derivate for port 1’s demand from (A.13) and the first 
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The obtained values give, 
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Similar result is obtained for port 2. As it satisfies the contract condition, the Nash 
equilibrium port price, shown in (3.23), is unique. 













Linear Congestion Delay Cost function 
Proof of Proposition 1 
The first order derivate of (3.25) can be obtained 
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   
The second order derivate for port 1’ profit with respect to its price is given (A.14).                              
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Therefore, 1 is concave in 1 . Similar result can be obtained for port 2.                        
Proof of Proposition 2 
To solve (A.16), we can get the second order derivate for port 1’s demand from (A.17) 
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The obtained values justify, 
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The contract condition is satisfied only when 1 22g g . If port 2’ transshipment level is 
more than double of port 1’s, the Nash equilibrium port price may not be unique. 


















We conduct the numerical simulation based on Kuhn-Tucker condition. First, shipping 
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Transform the shipping line 1’s form to Lagrangian, 
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The first order conditions are as follows: 
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Proof of Lemma 2 
Let   be a move made by shipping line 1 from current Nash Equilibrium point (1, 0). 
Using Taylor series expansion, evaluate the shipping line 1’s shift, 1  , while 
shipping line 2 remains at current Nash Equilibrium (1, 0). Taylor series expansion 
gives,    (1 ) 1 1       and solve for  1  gives 
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The profit for shipping line 1 at Nash Equilibrium (1, 0) is: 
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The profit for shipping line 1 at  1 ,  0  is: 
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(A.21) 
Since it is a symmetric port case, assuming 1 2 1 2 1 2,  , K K g g     
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As assumed (1, 0) is not a Nash equilibrium,  
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Finally, the threshold capacity level is found. It gives that (1, 0) is not Nash 











Proof of Lemma 3 
Let  be a move made by shipping line 1 from the Nash Equilibrium point (1, 1). 
Using Taylor series expansion, evaluate the shipping line 1’s shift, 1  , while 
shipping line 2 remains at current Nash Equilibrium (1, 1). 
Taylor series expansion gives,  
   (1 ) 1 1       
Solving for  1  gives 
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The profit for shipping line 1 at Nash Equilibrium (1, 1) is :  
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The profit for shipping line 1 at  1 ,  1  is: 
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(A.23) 
Since it is symmetric port case, assuming  
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As assumed (1, 1) is not the Nash equilibrium, then we have 
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The threshold capacity level is found. It gives that (1, 1) is not Nash Equilibrium when 
the port capacity falls in above condition. 







Proof of Theorem 3 




2 be a move made by shipping line 2 in order to respond to 1 . The purpose of this 
marginal analysis is to find the coefficient between shipping lines’ move on BRCs. 
Using Taylor series expansion, we first study the partial derivative of: 
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Binomial Taylor series give: 
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The simplified partial derivative is obtained below, 
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Searching equilibrium port price starts with port 1’s given pricing strategy. While port 
1 fixes its price at a certain value, port 2 gives all possible prices of own and search for 
the price that returns maximum profit. Referring to Table A.1, port 1’s price is given 
as an arbitrary value while port 2 is varying the whole range of price values. Once the 
best of profits is obtained, it is stored in representative variable with the information of 
profit and the value of price.  
Table A.1 An example of port price searching logic 
µ1 µ2 Port 1’s 
profit 
Port 2 ‘s 
profit 
0.24 0.11 -0.75 -1.58273
0.24 0.12 -0.75 -1.37454
0.24 0.13 -0.75 -1.16636
0.24 0.14 -0.75 -0.95818
0.24 0.15 -0.75 -0.75
0.24 0.16 -0.75 -0.54182
0.24 0.17 -0.5544 -0.40386
0.24 0.18 -0.4786 -0.26575
0.24 0.19 -0.3986 -0.15087
0.24 0.2 -0.3133 -0.05992
0.24 0.21 -0.2227 0.00673
0.24 0.22 -0.1273 0.0495
0.24 0.23 -0.0289 0.0699
0.24 0.24 0.0706 0.07059
0.24 0.25 0.1688 0.055
0.24 0.26 0.2639 0.02666
0.24 0.27 0.3546 -0.01129
0.24 0.28 0.4401 -0.05634
0.24 0.29 0.5203 -0.10667
0.24 0.3 0.5955 -0.16101
0.24 0.31 0.666 -0.21844
0.24 0.32 0.7322 -0.27839
0.24 0.33 0.7947 -0.34047
0.24 0.34 0.854 -0.40447






Searching the best 







Matlab Code for searching Nash equilibrium of port price 
 
%fix u1, vary u2% 
  
for u1=u1_lp:0.005:u1_up 
   j=j+1; 
P_max=0; 
    for u2=u2_lp:0.005:u2_up 
    i=i+1; 
  
x0 = [0,0];            % Make a starting guess at the solution 
  
options = optimset('LargeScale','off'); 
options=optimset(options,'MaxFunEvals',10000000000000000000); 
options=optimset(options, 'MaxIter',10000000000000000000); 
x = fmincon(@(x)objfun(x,p,c,N,b,u1,u2,K,a,g,O,m),x0,[],[],[],[],[],[],...  
   @(x)confuneq(x,p,c,N,b,u1,u2,K,a,g,O,m), options) 
[f,Q,F_11,F_12,F_21,F_22,F,D]= objfun(x,p,c,N,b,u1,u2,K,a,g,O,m); 













if (P_2 > P_max) 
    P_max=P_2; 










   k=k+1; 
P1_max=0; 
    for u1=u1_lp:0.005:u1_up 
    l=l+1; 
  
x0 = [0,0];            % Make a starting guess at the solution 
  







x = fmincon(@(x)objfun(x,p,c,N,b,u1,u2,K,a,g,O,m),x0,[],[],[],[],[],[],...  
   @(x)confuneq(x,p,c,N,b,u1,u2,K,a,g,O,m), options) 
[f,Q,F_11,F_12,F_21,F_22,F,D]= objfun(x,p,c,N,b,u1,u2,K,a,g,O,m); 












if (P_1 > P1_max) 
    P1_max=P_1; 
    best_br(k)=array1(l); 
     
end 
    end 
     
end 
 
% best response table% 
t=0; 
for gp=u1_lp:0.005:u1_up 
t=t+1; 
array11(t)=gp; 
array12(t)=best_br(k-j+t); 
end 
 
 
 
 
 
 
